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Abstract 
This paper describes a resolution process for faltering financial firms that quickly allocates losses to 
bondholders and transfers ownership of the firm to them.  This process overcomes the most serious flaws 
in resolution plans submitted by banks under Dodd-Frank Title I and in the FDIC receivership procedure 
in Dodd-Frank Title II by restoring the balance sheet of a failing financial institution and immediately 
replacing the management and board of directors who allowed its demise.  In almost all bank failures, this 
process would eliminate the need for government involvement beyond court certification of the 
reorganization.  The procedure overcomes the serious incentive distortions and inefficiencies that result 
from bailouts, and avoids the destruction of value and financial market turmoil that would result from the 
bankruptcies and liquidations that Dodd-Frank requires for distressed and failing banks. 
 
Background 
     For decades, bailouts have been a standard response when financial firms falter or fail. 
National treasuries, central banks, and transnational political entities such as the European Union 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have, due to the absence of alternative resolution 
mechanisms, taken responsibility for stabilizing financial systems in many countries over the 
past decades.  Over the past several years, political pressures have built in most developed 
economies to replace bailouts with ‘bail-ins’, in which a financial firm’s creditors will bear 
responsibility for losses incurred by the bank if it fails.  In the U.S. these procedures are 
mandated in Title I Section 165(d) and Title II (Orderly Liquidation Authority) of the Dodd-
Frank Act.
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1
  Throughout this document, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act will be referred to 
as the Dodd-Frank Act. See https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr4173enr/pdf/BILLS-111hr4173enr.pdf. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3047529 
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     Although the Dodd-Frank Act is intended to eliminate bailouts, the resolution procedures 
adopted in it have many of the same flaws that led financial markets to freeze when Lehman 
Brothers failed and other financial institutions were bailed out in 2008.  Title I of the Dodd- 
Frank Act requires each systemically important bank to develop detailed plans that specify 
procedures for its own resolution if it is about to collapse.
2
  The resolution strategies submitted to 
the Federal Reserve and the FDIC to date rely primarily on either (1) a holding company that 
will sell some of its subsidiaries to recapitalize the remaining entities while the holding company 
itself files for bankruptcy protection or (2) a “bridge bank” that will receive the high-quality 
assets of the failing firm and most of its liabilities, leaving some impaired assets and most long-
term debt behind when the bank enters bankruptcy.  If the resolution process devised by the 
company in compliance with Title I Section 165(d) is not implemented successfully and in a 
timely manner, Title II requires the FDIC to take control of the firm in receivership.
3
  The 
receivership process described in Title II confers almost unlimited authority on the government 
appointed trustees in the event that the voluntary resolution process fails.
4
  Criticism has been 
leveled at the Dodd-Frank for its harshness
5
 and for its subversion of constitutionally guaranteed 
protections.
6
 Other legal arguments could be mounted against Dodd-Frank, such as those  
developed in Hamburger (2014) and in Lawson (2015) to address the expansive authority of 
                                                          
2
  See Title I, Section 165 (d) and the records of the public submissions by banks and the responses from the Federal 
Reserve and the FDIC at https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans.htm. See Lee (2015) for 
analysis of the banks’ resolution plans, especially pp. 464 - 486 which describe the adoption of the holding 
company and bridge bank approaches (jointly known as the single-point-of-entry or SPOE approach). 
3
  Even the FDIC has sought to avoid the path of liquidation, with most of its efforts directed toward review and 
assessment of the banks’ Title I resolution plans.  See Lee (2015, pp. 476-78) for discussion of the pivot by the 
FDIC from Title II liquidation toward Title I resolution planning. 
4
  McDermott and Turetsky (2011, p. 412) describe the extent of the receiver’s control.  "Once the FDIC is 
appointed receiver of a covered financial company, it assumes virtually complete control over the company and 
the receivership process. The perfunctory role of the courts in the core receivership process ends, and there are 
limited avenues for challenging the various ancillary decisions that the FDIC may make in pursuing the 
liquidation." 
5
  McDermott and Turetsky (2011, p. 404) argue that "the provisions of the Act and the powers delegated to the 
FDIC and other government authorities may be draconian when implemented. The right to decide whether to 
initiate receivership proceedings is vested in government authorities, not in financial companies' boards, 
management, or stakeholders, and is subject only to very limited judicial review that is highly deferential to such 
authorities." 
6
  Merrill and Merrill (2104) argue that Dodd-Frank Title II violates the due process clause in the 5th amendment 
and subverts judicial review in Article III of the constitution, among other issues. 
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administrative agencies.
7 The legal arguments against Dodd-Frank are worth pursuing in their 
own right, but the argument put forth and emphasized in this paper is that the Dodd-Frank 
procedures impose unnecessary administrative oversight and authority in the resolution of 
distressed financial firms: a simpler, less disruptive, more transparent market-oriented process 
can be implemented that defines and respects rights of the firms’ creditors. 
    One of the serious flaws of the Dodd-Frank Act is that, unlike the bankruptcy code, similarly 
situated creditors will not necessarily be treated equally, under the banks’ own resolution plans 
or in FDIC receivership.  When a bank or the FDIC creates a bridge bank and places assets and 
some liabilities into it, the creditors whose claims are moved to the successor bank or bridge 
bank will have claims on a going concern.  Effectively, their claims will be protected completely 
from the consequences of the firm’s collapse.  The creditors whose claims are left behind in the 
predecessor bank will have claims that may – like those of the unsecured creditors of Lehman 
Brothers – incur severe losses.  Under Title I resolution plans, allocation of claims to the solvent 
and insolvent entities will be at the discretion of the bank’s management and board of directors; 
in Title II liquidation FDIC receivers will decide, with no avenue for judicial review. The 
challenge of a reorganization regime for large, systemically important financial firms is to 
balance the need to maintain the core functions of the firm against the goal of giving equal 
treatment to similarly situated creditors.  Our proposal gives precedence to the objective of 
maintaining the core functions of the firm, but we also avoid the different treatment of similarly 
situated creditors by creating a class of creditors who know ex ante that they would be called 
upon to absorb losses but also know that they will be compensated with ownership of the firm 
after reorganization. 
     After a brief review of the balance sheet consequences of an asset collapse, I provide a 
summary of reorganization bonds, which are a private, market oriented resolution procedure that 
Vernon Smith and I proposed in a short article in the Wall Street Journal in 2014.  Following the 
                                                          
7
  Hamburger (2014) argues that agencies frequently combine legislative functions in their rulemaking, executive 
functions in their oversight and enforcement, and judicial functions with their administrative law judges.  One of 
Hamburger’s primary arguments is that agencies violate the separation of powers, remove legislative functions 
from elective bodies, and eliminate judicial review by judges appointed by the elected executive who are 
confirmed by elected representatives.  These arguments clearly have relevance to agency authority in Dodd-Frank, 
which is extensive and operates explicitly without even the administrative law review provided by other agencies, 
such as the SEC, the NLRB, the FAA, the EEOC, and dozens of other federal agencies. 
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description of reorganization bonds, I describe the alternatives to them that have been mandated 
under Dodd-Frank, along with limitations of those alternatives and how reorganization bonds 
can overcome the flaws in the Dodd-Frank resolution and liquidation processes. 
Asset Collapse and Insolvency 
     The diagram on the left side of Figure 1 shows a stylized balance sheet with key asset and 
liability items for a bank with positive equity.  The diagram on the right side of Figure 1 shows 
the same bank’s balance sheet if the value of its assets collapses; in that diagram the bank’s 
equity position disappears and the bank becomes insolvent.  A bailout would add cash to the 
asset side of the balance sheet and more debt to the liability side of the balance sheet, leaving the 
balance sheet hole the same size.  A bailed-out bank typically takes earnings from the healthy 
portion of its asset portfolio as they come in over the course of many years and moves them to 
loss reserves so that impaired assets can be removed from the books.  During this long period the 
bank has suppressed earnings to dedicate to dividends, stock buybacks, or organic growth.  One 
consequence of this is that the bank has difficulty finding capital investment, and it will typically 
deleverage as the only avenue available to it to raise its capital to asset ratio.  A method is needed 
to remove some of the liabilities from the bank’s balance sheet.  Bankruptcy does that, but at the 
cost of major disruption to the firm, to financial markets, and to the wider economy.  Our 
proposal achieves the same goal with far less trauma. 
 
Figure 1: Assets and Liabilities before (left) and after (right) asset values collapse. 
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Reorganization bonds 
     We propose creation of a class of bonds that sits between equity and all other creditors in the 
hierarchy of firm obligations.  These bonds, which we called ‘Reorganization’ or ‘R’ bonds 
in Gjerstad and Smith (2014), would be converted to equity immediately upon failure of a 
firm.
8
 I want to emphasize that Reorganization bonds differ in a crucial respect from 
contingent convertible bonds, because we propose that ownership and control of the 
corporation would pass to the bondholders with conversion of the bonds to equity.  This 
is crucial because contingent convertible bonds simply provide the managers who have 
failed with a new pool of capital, and profits that the firm accrues  after conversion would 
be shared by the owners of the contingent convertible bonds with incumbent 
shareholders.
9
  Under our proposal, if an asset value collapse causes a firm to run out of 
equity capital – that is, the firm becomes insolvent – the incumbent equity holders’ shares 
are eliminated, the ‘R’ bonds are converted to equity, and the holders of the equity that 
was created by conversion of the ‘R’ bonds become the sole owners of the firm.  Figure 2 
shows how ‘R’ bonds are created from standard long-term debt.  Figure 3 shows the 
effect of eliminating the claims of the original equity holders and converting the ‘R’ 
bonds to a new equity pool.  After the ‘R’ bonds are converted, the board of directors 
selected by the bondholders’ committee and the new management team will take control 
of the firm.  Contingent convertible bonds would reward mismanagement and failure with 
new capital; our proposal circumvents this incentive flaw. 
                                                          
8
  By a failure, I mean events like those that precipitated government interventions on behalf of Bear Stearns 
between March 14 and March 16, 2008, the collapse of Lehman Brothers 6 months later, and the intervention on 
behalf of AIG on September 16, 2008. 
9
  Many authors suggest that these bonds could convert to equity if the market capitalization of the firms passes 
below some threshold, such as 2 percent of the firm’s liabilities.  When the threshold is crossed, some amount of 
the bonds would be converted to equity at the market price of equity shares when the threshold was passed. There 
are at least three significant problems with this approach. One issue is that if the equity price crosses the threshold 
on its way lower, bond conversion bails out the incumbent shareholders before their shares lose more or all of 
their value.  The second consideration is that these procedures also leave the incumbent management and board in 
control of the firm.  A third problem is that, with the management and board in control of the firm, the new equity 
holders have minimal protection against the incumbent management and board enriching themselves at the 
expense of the new equity holders before the new equity holders can wage a fight for control of the firm.  For all 
of these reasons I argue that it would be better to allow the firm to enter a pre-packaged bankruptcy where the 
bondholders are rewarded with control of the firm. 
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Figure 2: Splitting long-term debt into ‘R’ bonds and standard long-term bonds. 
     With this structure, ‘R’ bonds should trade at almost the same price as the bank’s standard 
corporate bonds when the likelihood of failure is near zero, so that a sound bank will face no 
additional cost of funding with this arrangement.  If the bank does become insolvent, then prior 
equity holder claims are eliminated when ‘R’ bonds convert to equity.  If losses on assets are less 
than the sum of the pre-crisis book value of equity and the amount of ‘R’ bonds, then the bank’s 
solvency is restored under our procedure and the reorganization will produce a new equity 
cushion owned exclusively by the investors whose ‘R’ bonds were converted.  With established 
criteria that trigger conversion, the ad hoc nature of bailouts, the public funds that support them 
and their severe incentive distortions can all be eliminated. 
    
Figure 3: Converting ‘R’ bonds to equity after an asset collapse. 
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     Conversion of long-term bonds to equity is a key element of our proposal.  We propose that, 
if equity capital is depleted and the firm is on the brink of default, 12% of the firm’s liabilities 
could be converted into equity capital.  Table 1 shows the liabilities of the ten largest banks in 
the U.S. at the end of 2007; it also shows the amount of long-term debt that each one had 
outstanding.  Each of these firms had between 12.6% and 26.4% of their liabilities in the form of 
long-term bonds, so that each would have been able to meet the threshold for ‘R’ bond issuance 
without a substantial change to its financing costs. 
 
Table 1: Long-term debt and equity relative to total liabilities at the end of 2007. 
 
Triggers 
     At the end of 2007, the book value of equity capital at Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill 
Lynch, and Morgan Stanley had fallen to levels just above 3% of liabilities.  (See Table 1, 
columns 4 and 5.)  The Federal Reserve carried out a back-door bailout of Bear Stearns by 
lending $28.82 billion to Maiden Lane LLC to purchase impaired Bear Stearns assets in March 
2008.  Lehman Brothers failed in September 2008.  Merrill Lynch was sold to Bank of America 
with loss guarantees on $118 billion of its assets from the Federal Reserve.  All three of these 
firms had inadequate book value of equity capital by the end of 2007, and it is quite likely that 
the asset sides of their balance sheets were overstated due to overvalued mortgage securities on 
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their books.10 By January 8, 2008, the market capitalization of Bear Stearns was only $8.4 
billion, or about 2.2% of its liabilities.  This is a threshold that clearly requires a contingency 
plan for reorganization.  By July 14, 2008, Lehman Brothers market capitalization had fallen as 
low as $8.6 billion.  With $613 in liabilities, equity capital had fallen to 1.4% of liabilities.  On 
the same day, market capitalization of Washington Mutual fell to $5.5 billion, or 1.9% of its 
liabilities.  With these firms in such dire condition, under our proposal bondholders’ committees 
would begin final preparations for a takeover. 
Challenges for Resolution Plans and Orderly Liquidation 
     Title I Resolution plans have a number of common features.  Some of the banks have 
implemented a holding company structure.  Others would utilize a bridge bank in the event of 
failure.  When a holding company is utilized, it would commit substantial resources to its 
subsidiaries before it enters bankruptcy.  The subsidiaries would continue as going concerns until 
they are sold and the proceeds are returned to the estate of the holding company.  A bridge bank 
would operate similarly, but may be preferred for a firm that has few subsidiaries.  
     Despite the limitations of the Title I resolution procedures, assessments of the banks plans by 
the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board have led to progress on several important problems. 
Resolution planning has required firms to better align their business operations with their 
material legal entities, insure that the constituent parts of the firm have access to financial market 
utilities (especially payment systems and trading and settlement operations), and the banks have 
implemented service agreements that would provide continued access to information technology 
support and other critical services to subsidiaries upon a break-up of the firm.  Significant 
progress has also been made to extend the automatic stay in bankruptcies on contracts to include 
derivatives, futures, and swaps.  This makes less likely a repeat of the severe losses precipitated 
by collateral seizures and sales that followed the Lehman bankruptcy. But the banks’ resolution 
plans depend almost entirely on the optimistic assumption that Global Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs) can resolve themselves and avoid disruption to the U.S. and 
                                                          
10
 Washington Mutual provides a good example of this. In its 10-Q filing on June 30, 2008, Washington Mutual had 
book value of equity capital of $26.09 billion (about 9.2% of its liabilities) but at that time the market value of its 
equity capital was only $8.24 billion (about 2.9% of equity capital).  A closer examination of its balance sheet 
reveals an extraordinary level of exposure to residential real estate, with $230.2 billion in real estate loans and 
$19.2 billion in mortgage-backed securities. Real estate lending amounted to 79% of assets. 
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global financial system by breaking themselves apart and selling the pieces - presumably to other 
G-SIFIs.  Of course, financial distress is highly correlated, so many of the largest financial firms 
will be turning to one another to raise capital.  Even if that were possible, the sale of Lehman 
Brothers investment banking and capital market accounts to Barclays in a Section 363 sale in 
September 2008 provides insight into the limited capital raised by such sales, and the potential 
for serious harm to the interests of the seller – in this case the Lehman Brothers estate.  
According to the Trustee of the estate, James Giddens, Lehman Brothers transferred assets worth 
approximately $11,869 million to Barclays.  In addition, Barclays gained over 72,000 customer 
accounts with assets of $43,000 million (about $600,000 per account).
11
 Barclays in return paid 
$2,438 million on behalf of Lehman Brothers to third parties. 
     Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act would transfer control over a faltering financial institution to 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as the receiver, charged with liquidation of 
the firms’ assets and payment of claims against the firm.  The draconian elements of Title II are 
well-known
12
, but Title II is also set up to wreak economic havoc, since it relies solely on sales 
of major business lines and liquidation of the firm. The Lehman Brothers liquidation had 
catastrophic results for the firms’ creditors.  In the case of Lehman Brothers, senior bondholders 
received their first payment in April 2012, three and a half years after the bankruptcy filing. 
Unsecured creditors received their first distribution in September 2014, six years after the 
bankruptcy filing.
13
  Fleming and Sarkur (2014) found that, as of March 27, 2014 allowed claims 
to creditors stood at $303.6 billion dollars. With its Twelfth Plan Distribution to Senior 
Noteholders on April 6, 2017, Wilmington Trust reached a payout of approximately 41.8% to 
senior bondholders.
14  Unsecured creditors have had a comparable payout percentage.  Since the 
estate resolution is nearly complete, losses should end up at approximately 58% of the $303.6 
                                                          
11
 See the State of the Estate, pp. 24 - 25, August 16, 2016 from Hughes Hubbard & Reed (the law firm of the 
trustee). 
12
 McDermott (2010, p. 2), in an analysis from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP argues that “the 
potential harshness of the Act ultimately may mean that its most salutary effect will be to minimize the 
circumstances under which it will, in fact, be used.”  Lee (2015, p. 453) points out that “Various critics of Title II 
maintained that ... Title II would be a non-transparent process and would not be administered according to a clear 
set of rules and settled precedents in sharp contrast to the Bankruptcy Code.  These critics maintained that the 
[Senate] changes did not alter the fact that the federal government would be choosing which entities to resolve 
under Title II and which creditors to protect.” 
13
 See the State of the Estate, pp. 27, op. cit. in footnote 11. 
14
 See Wilmington Trust notices to senior noteholders: https://www.wilmingtontrust.com/lehman/notices.html. 
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billion in allowed claims, or a loss of approximately $176.1 billion to Lehman Brothers creditors. 
The time frame for payments to creditors, the scale of the losses, and the ex ante lack of clarity 
regarding how losses would be allocated to creditors could be disastrous for financial markets in 
future liquidations as they were with Lehman Brothers. 
Conclusions 
In this paper I have described a procedure that is capable of addressing the principle challenge of 
reorganizing failing financial institutions: maintaining the core intermediation and payment 
functions of the firm, avoiding a fire sale of its assets to cover liabilities, and allocating losses in 
a manner that is transparent and understood by a firm’s creditors ex ante.  Many of the 
challenges facing resolution regimes are obviated by our procedure.  The firm remains as a going 
concern, maintaining both the core functions of the firm and all contractual obligations other 
than its long-term debt obligations to the holders of the Reorganization Bonds (which are 
replaced with equity).  Concerns that have been raised by the FDIC regarding availability of 
debtor-in-possession financing are avoided, as are the incentives of foreign regulators and 
governments to ring-fence the assets of subsidiaries in their jurisdiction.  Other concerns with 
resolution and liquidation regimes are also mitigated.  Calabria (2015) points out that “the 
Treasury … may have felt that allowing a default on GSE debt would be viewed internationally 
as the equivalent of a default by the U.S. government.” Concerns of this sort may lead regulators 
and politicians to ignore the law altogether and proceed with a bailout, as they did with the 
resolution procedures for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2008, or it may lead to pressures to 
include some favored creditors of a failing bank in the debts of the bridge bank and less fortunate 
or less favored creditors in the bankruptcy.  The ambiguous status of creditors under both the 
Title I resolution plans and the Title II liquidation procedures leave either of these possibilities 
open.  Our procedure, by specifying particular long-term debt for conversion, lessens the 
pressure for a bailout and eliminates the possibility of favored treatment by government receivers 
for particular creditors of a failing financial institution. 
     The procedures could be developed in a new Chapter 14 of the bankruptcy code or in 
modifications to Chapter 11 for systemically important financial institutions.  A great deal of 
work has been done to plan for the contingency that an important financial firm must enter 
bankruptcy or be liquidated.  It would be good though to avoid those paths with a process that 
11 
 
maintains all of the functions of a major financial institution without interruption, and 
prepositions liabilities that can be dedicated to recapitalize a failing financial firm in a manner 
that is known ex ante to regulators, to the firm’s creditors, and to other market participants. 
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